















The	 aim	 is	 to	 broaden	 our	 knowledge	 about	 the	 counterfeiting	 trade,	 to	 develop	 a	 clear	
understanding	of	the	illegitimate	market,	and	to	help	to	renew	countermeasures	that	not	only	
enable	the	exercising	of	tighter	control	over	the	counterfeiting	industry	but	also	disrupt	the	
illegal	 behaviours	 of	 counterfeiters.	 Rather	 than	 place	 emphasis	 on	 the	 protection	 of	
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In	 the	 existing	 literature,	 counterfeiting	 activities	 are	 often	 presented	 in	 the	 category	 of	
intellectual	property	(IP)	crimes,	of	which	the	legal	basis	is	in	the	law	concerning	the	protection	
of	intellectual	property	rights	(IPRs).	Typically,	counterfeit	goods	are	films	and	sound	recordings,	
computer	 software,	 designer	 clothing,	 shoes	 and	 fashion	 accessories	 (Norman	 2014).	 For	
ordinary	consumers,	counterfeiting—often	associated	with	 imitating	 luxury	brands—seems	to	
link	with	 the	 fashion	 industry	 and	 the	middle‐class	 lifestyle,	 and	 the	word	 ‘counterfeiting’	 is	
somehow	glamorised.	In	fact,	counterfeiting	is	an	industry	that	is	driven	by	market	demand	and	







losses	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 flow	 of	 ‘fake	 goods’	 are	 used	 as	 measures	 to	 assess	 the	 cost	 of	
counterfeiting	to	local,	regional	and	global	economy.	Accordingly,	the	counterfeiting	trade	has	a	
considerable	economic	impact	and,	therefore,	warrants	official	attention	(see,	for	example,	United	
Nations	 Office	 on	 Drugs	 and	 Crime	 2014).	 Research	 has	 also	 suggested	 links	 between	
counterfeiting	and	organised	crime	(see,	for	example,	Gowers	2006;	Lowe	2006;	Reynolds	and	
McKee	 2010;	 Satchwell	 2004;	 Treverton	 et	 al.	 2009).	 An	 earlier	 ‘general	 criminological	




commodity	 (see	 National	 Crime	 Agency	 2017).	 This	 is	 perhaps	 because	 of	 other	 competing	
threats	(for	example,	the	sexual	exploitation	of	children,	firearms	smuggling,	cybercrime,	human	




harms	of	 the	 trade	 in	 dangerous	 counterfeit	 goods	need	 thorough	 investigation	 to	 gain	 fuller	
appreciation	of	the	scope	of	the	problem.		
	
This	article	 focuses	on	one	 type	of	dangerous	counterfeit	goods—fake	wines.	 It	uses	 the	wine	
counterfeiting	trade	in	China	as	a	single	case	study	to	discuss	three	important	themes	in	relation	
to	 product	 counterfeiting:	 the	 definition	 of	 counterfeiting;	 the	 scope,	 scale	 and	 social	 and	
operational	organisation	of	 the	counterfeit	business;	 and	 the	policing	of	 counterfeit	 goods,	 an	
important	 subject	 for	 academic	 research	 (Wall	 and	 Large	 2010).	 The	 aim	 of	 this	 article	 is	 to	
broaden	our	knowledge	about	the	counterfeiting	business,	develop	a	clear	understanding	of	the	
illegitimate	market,	and	help	to	renew	and	advance	countermeasures	that	not	only	enable	the	















While	 counterfeiting	 is	 not	 defined	 in	 the	 law	 in	 many	 jurisdictions,	 a	 legal	 definition	 for	
‘counterfeit	 goods’	 is	 available	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 (EU)	 context.	 The	 ‘Border	 Measures	
Regulation’	(EU	Regulation	No.	608/2013	concerning	customs	enforcement	of	IPRs),	for	example,	
provides	 the	definition	of	 ‘pirated’	or	 ‘counterfeit’	 goods	under	Article	2(5)	 and	 (6):	handling	
‘counterfeit	 goods’	 infringes	 trademarks,	 whilst	 dealing	 with	 ‘pirated	 goods’	 involves	
infringements	of	copyright,	related	rights	and	design	rights.	Thus,	IP	infringement	covers	piracy	
and	 counterfeiting.	 In	 practice,	 however,	 infringement	 of	 some	 IPRs	 can	 be	 described	 as	




Lin	 (2011)	 explained	 counterfeiting	 by	 dividing	 it	 into	 three	 types	 of	 infringements:	 the	




to	 protect	 legitimate	 traders’	 economic	 interests,	 but	 also	 to	 prevent	 consumers	 from	 being	














for	 which	 the	 maximum	 penalty	 is	 life	 imprisonment.	 Under	 the	 existing	 law,	 the	 sale	 of	
counterfeit	goods	is	also	a	criminal	offence	if	a	person	has	sold	or	offered	counterfeit	goods	for	








a	 serious	 crime	which	undermines	 the	economic	order	of	 the	 socialist	market	 and	endangers	









Lord	 et	 al.	 2017;	 Shen	 and	 Antonopoulos	 2016;	 Vandagraf	 2015),	 this	 article	 discusses	wine	










millennium	 (Zhong	 2002).	 Initially,	 wines	 were	 consumed	 mainly	 by	 urban	 youths	 and	 the	
middle‐aged	 and	 high‐salaried	 professionals	 in	 first‐tier	 (Beijing,	 Shanghai,	 Guangzhou,	
Shenzhen,	Tianjin)	and	second‐tier	(including	Dalian,	Qingdao,	Hangzhou,	Nanjing	and	Xiamen)	
cities	in	the	developed	coastal	regions.	In	the	1990s,	there	was	a	popular	saying:	‘Being	wen‐bao	
(having	 adequate	 food	 and	 clothing)	 one	 drinks	 liquor;	 being	 xiao‐kang	 (fairly	 well‐off),	 one	
drinks	 beer;	 and	 being	 fu‐yu	 (affluent),	 one	 drinks	wine’	 (Liu	 1998:	 46).	 Gradually,	 the	wine	
market	has	expanded	to	third‐tier	cities	and	to	some	rural	areas	in	China	(Li	et	al.	2007).	Now,	
the	wine	market	 is	 ‘booming’	 (Byrnes	 2013)	 and,	 accordingly,	 the	wine	 industry	 is	 ‘thriving’	
(Global	City	Media	2015).		
	
In	 the	 Chinese	wine	market,	 imported	wines	 are	 increasingly	 gaining	 popularity.	 In	 the	mid‐
1990s,	 foreign	 wines	 started	 to	 flood	 into	 China,	 mainly	 from	 France,	 Italy,	 Spain,	 Hungary,	
Portugal	 and	Australia.	 In	 recent	 years,	 it	was	 estimated	 that	 Europe	 exported	 nearly	USD$1	
billion	worth	of	wine	to	China	(Byrnes	2013),	and	imports	represented	more	than	30	per	cent	of	
the	1.9	billion	bottles	of	wine	 sold	 annually	 in	mainland	China	 and	Hong	Kong	 (Huang	2012;	
Zhang	et	al.	2013).	Unsurprisingly,	the	wine	counterfeiting	business	is	flourishing.	
	
In	 the	 1990s,	 copies	 of	 the	 top	 three	 branded	 Chinese	 wines—Zhangyu,	 the	 Great	 Wall	 and	
Dynasty—as	well	as	some	top‐end	foreign	wine	brands	were	discovered	(Huang	2012).	It	was	
revealed	in	2013	that	just	under	50,000	bottles	of	Lafite	were	imported	to	China	annually,	but	
















be	 consistent	 with	 the	 anecdotal	 evidence.	 For	 example,	 in	 a	 popular	 TV	 series—Let’s	 Get	














Generally	 speaking,	 the	 counterfeiting	 process	 of	 most	 products	 primarily	 consists	 of	







including	 the	 level	 of	 start‐up	 capital,	 expected	 quality	 of	 the	 fakes,	 availability	 of	 product	




genuine	 labels	 are	 still	 attached.	 Using	 original	 bottles	 makes	 it	 easy	 to	 deceive	 unaware	
consumers.	 Relatedly,	 there	 has	 been	 an	 ‘extraordinary	 demand’	 for	 empty	bottles	 of	 famous	
wines	 (Taylor	 2016;	 Vandagraf	 2015)	 and	 this	method	 of	 deception	 explains	why	 a	 buyer	 in	
Beijing	paid	2,900	yuan	(about	£330)	for	a	used	bottle	of	Lafite	Rothschild	(Moore	2011).		
	
Re‐labelling	 is	 another	 common	 method	 which	 involves	 replicating	 bottles	 or	 labels	 of	 the	
genuine,	usually	cheap,	brands.	For	example,	counterfeiters	will	replace	the	label	on	the	bottle	of	
Charles	Shaw	with	that	of	Castel	in	order	to	sell	the	fake	Castel	at	a	high	price.	In	a	police	raid	in	




Furthermore,	 labelling	 is	 also	 frequently	 used	 in	 fake	 wine	 production.	 In	 the	 counterfeiting	
industry,	bai‐ban	(literally	‘blank	board’,	meaning	unbranded	and	unlabelled	products)	are	often	
produced.	They	are	subsequently	‘branded’	with	counterfeit	labels	of	genuine	brands	according	
to	 order	 or	 demand	 (Guo	 2002;	 Ye	 2000).	 CCTV	 (2010)—China’s	 state	 television	 channel—





materials	 is	 much	 easier	 in	 China	 because	 the	 majority	 of	 Chinese	 consumers	 as	 well	 as	
counterfeiters	do	not	have	much	wine	knowledge,	nor	do	they	know	much	English	or	any	other	
foreign	language	(Yi	2011).	People	typically	have	no	idea	what	the	authentic	product	looks	like.	
Consequently,	 even	 obvious	 spelling	mistakes	 and	 other	 erroneous	 details	 on	 the	 labels	 and	
packaging	may	not	appear	as	fakes	to	these	consumers.	For	the	same	reason,	counterfeiters	may	
simply	make	up	brand	names	to	label	their	fakes	(Sun	and	Yao	2004),	and	such	behaviour	does	
not	 usually	 violate	 anyone’s	 IPRs.	 Boyce	 (2012)	 observed	 that	 wine	 counterfeiters	 often	 use	
invented	brand	names	and	addresses	relating	to	places	abroad	to	claim	a	foreign	appellation	for	
wines	which	are,	in	fact,	made	in	China.	Consumers’	lack	of	wine	knowledge	has	been	exploited	

































spoiled	 grapes—that	 is,	 grapes	 not	 fit	 for	 consumption—to	 produce	 wine	 for	 export.	 These	
imports	have	needed	re‐processing,	by	way	of	adding	chemicals,	to	remove	mouldy	smells	and	
improve	the	colour.	Often,	the	alcoholic	component	has	been	considerably	diluted	in	the	lengthy	
international	 transport	 process,	 and	 the	 deteriorated	 imports	 have	 been	 blended	with	 edible	
alcohol	 and	 various	 chemicals	 to	 improve	 their	marketability.	 Commonly,	 colourant	 has	 been	









Along	 with	 imported	 fakes,	 ‘imported	 wines’	 may	 be	 faked	 in	 China.	 Apart	 from	 labelling	 as	
explained	 earlier,	 counterfeiters	 may	 technically	 turn	 domestic	 wines	 into	 ‘imports’	 in	 the	
Customs	 Special	 Supervision	 Zones	 (CSSZs).	 The	 CSSZs	were	 established	 in	 2012	 to	 promote	
international	trade.	They	are	essentially	special	economic	zones	managed	mainly	by	provincial	
customs	authorities.	In	a	CSSZ,	goods	are	subject	to	simplified	customs	procedures,	tax	waivers	





Antonopoulos	 2016):	 counterfeiting	 entrepreneurs	 make	 use	 of	 the	 special	 economic	 zones	
where	the	relaxed	policing	and	customs	infrastructure	help	facilitate	the	counterfeiting	activities,	
such	as	falsification	of	documents,	to	avoid	interception	of	the	merchandise	by	the	authorities	









Existing	 data	 show	 that,	 like	 legitimate	 products,	 fake	 wines	 are	 usually	 distributed	 through	
various	 channels	 and	 sold	 in	 all	 kinds	 of	 wholesale	 and	 retail	 outlets,	 including	 online	
marketplaces	such	as	Taobao,	a	Chinese	website	for	online	shopping	similar	to	Amazon	and	eBay.	
Brand	name	foreign	wines	are	often	sold	at	high‐priced	nightclubs,	karaoke	bars	and	other	top‐
end	entertainment	 facilities.	Zhang	(2012)	observed	that	 Internet	vendors	willingly	 facilitated	
sales	of	counterfeit	wines	and	spirits.	Additives	such	as	 flavouring	and	colouring	essences	are	
available	 online,	 where	 they	 are	 expressly	 advertised	 as	 wine‐making	 ingredients.	WeChat	






sales	 records	 (China	News	 2014).	 Online	 sales	 further	 complicate	 law	 enforcement	 in	 several	
ways.	One	way	is	that	the	existing	law	is	vague	in	regards	to	online	trading	and,	in	practice,	no	





price.	Doing	 so	may	not	necessarily	 infringe	others’	 IPRs	but	may	 still	 be	highly	 profitable.	 A	
recent	case	showed	that	it	costs	less	than	100	yuan	to	make	this	type	of	fake	wines	but	the	retail	
price	could	be	as	high	as	3,000	yuan	(Editorial	2017).	These	counterfeits	of	what	appear	to	be,	
based	 on	 packaging	 and	 price,	 high	 quality	 end	 products	 are	 typically	 intended	 to	 deceive	











incidents	 were	 published	 in	 the	 popular	 media	 where	 counterfeit	 wines	 seized	 by	 Chinese	




export	 and	 wine	 counterfeiting	 is	 solely	 China’s	 domestic	 problem	 (Boyce	 2012).	 For	 Wang	


















Similar	 to	 other	 enforcement	 systems,	 such	 as	 the	 UK’s	 (see	 Lord	 et	 al.	 2017),	 a	 variety	 of	
authorities	 and	 agencies	 share	 responsibility	 for	 fighting	 alcohol	 counterfeiting	 in	 China,	
including,	inter	alia,	the	Ministry	of	Health	(MoH,	responsible	for	public	health),	China	Food	and	
Drug	Administration	 (CFDA,	 responsible	 for	 food	 safety),	 the	Anti‐Counterfeiting	Office	 (ACO,	










Administration	 for	 Industry	 &	 Commerce	 (SAIC)	 are	 enforcement	 authorities	 under	 direct	 leadership	 of	 the	 State	
Council	(SC).		






China’s	 Deputy	 Premier	 at	 that	 time	 and	 who	 is	 China’s	 Premier	 at	 the	 time	 of	 writing,	 is	 a	
regulatory	 body	 for	 food	 safety.	 It	 is	 now	 under	 the	 directorship	 of	 the	 current	 first	 Deputy	
Premier.	The	creation	of	this	public	office	headed	by	such	a	high‐ranking	official	appears	to	show	
the	commitment	of	the	central	government	to	food	safety.	Along	with	it,	the	MoH	(also	known	as	
the	 National	 Health	 Commission)	 takes	 primary	 responsibility	 for	 ensuring	 food	 safety,	 and	






safety.	 For	 example,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Agriculture	 is	 responsible	 for	 overseeing	 agricultural	
products	 (the	 start	 of	 the	 food	 supply	 chain);	 and	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Industry	 and	 Information	
Technology	and	the	MoC	govern	food	safety	in	production,	distribution	and	catering	services	(the	
end	of	the	food	supply	chain).	Several	agencies	under	direct	leadership	of	the	SC	are	enforcement	
authorities	 in	their	particular	 fields	of	administration,	as	Figure	1	shows,	 including	CFDA	(the	
































Likewise,	 GAQSIQ,	 formerly	 known	 as	 National	 Administration	 of	 Quality	 and	 Technology	
Inspection	(NAQTI),	is	a	national	authority	which	directs	its	local	bureaus	to	undertake	quality	
supervision	and	inspection.	Counterfeit	and	substandard	goods	may	be	detected	in	routine	and	
reactive	 inspections,	 and	 individuals	 and	 businesses	 involved	 may	 be	 administratively	
sanctioned.	The	GAQSIQ	also	leads	national	crackdowns	on	counterfeiting	goods.	For	example,	it	
launched	an	enforcement	campaign	targeting	alcohol	counterfeiting	in	2012,	jointly	with	six	other	
central	 government	 authorities.	 Locally,	 following	 a	 tip‐off,	 the	 Dantu	 Bureau	 of	 Quality	 and	


































division	of	 responsibilities	between	 them	 is	 lacking.	Consequently,	no	one	knows	exactly	who	
does	what,	 and	 this	 is	 illustrated	 in	 a	 popular	 saying:	 one	 agency	 cannot	manage	 it	whereas	
multiple	agencies	cannot	manage	it	well	(Liu	2013).	
	
Another	 shared	 problem	 links	 to	 departmentalism	 which	 may,	 in	 practice,	 result	 in	
administrative	 vacuums.	 Under	 departmentalism,	 each	 department—authority	 or	 agency—






Usually,	 alcohol	 counterfeiting—and	 product	 counterfeiting	 in	 general—is	 a	 cross‐region	 and	




jurisdiction	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Lord	et	 al.	 2017),	 let	 alone	 agencies	 in	different	 administrative	
regions.	This	is	also	a	shared	problem.		
	
There	are,	of	 course,	problems	specific	 to	China,	given	 its	unique	political,	 socioeconomic	and	
cultural	conditions.	One	such	problem	concerns	inconsistency	in	law	enforcement	and	sometimes	
‘capricious	 enforcement’	 (Dimitrov	 2009).	 Inconsistency	 in	 policy	 and	 practice	 appears	 to	 be	
commonplace	in	China	(Shen	2016a),	which	causes	confusion	and	sometimes	arbitrariness	in	law	
enforcement,	and	may	give	rise	to	legitimacy	concerns.	For	example,	da‐jia‐ban	 is	not	a	public	








Past	 research	 has	 identified	 local	 protectionism	 as	 a	 problem	 associated	 with	 product	
counterfeiting	(see	details	in	Chow	2004;	Kramer	2006;	Lin	2011;	Shen	and	Antonopoulos	2016;	




ingredients,	 packaging	 materials	 and	 accessories	 to	 the	 counterfeit	 businesses	 (Guangdong	












Law	enforcement	on	 alcohol	 counterfeiting	 in	China,	when	applied,	 appears	 to	be	oppressive.	
Despite	the	remaining	problems,	it	 is	recognised	that	anti‐counterfeiting	practices	from	a	food	






China:	 first,	 the	 definitional	 issue	 of	 counterfeiting;	 second,	 the	 scope	 and	 scale	 of	 the	 wine	
counterfeiting	business	and	how	fakes	are	made	available;	and,	third,	the	policing	of	counterfeit	











in	 them	violates	others’	 trademark	 rights.	 The	 second	 two	 types	may	or	may	not	 involve	 IPR	
infringements	but	are	fraudulent	and	may	amount	to	crime	in	China	and	many	other	legal	systems	





of	 Lin’s	 (2011)	 by	 embracing	 illegitimate	 behaviours	 which	 are	 conducted	 in	 the	 everyday	
counterfeiting	business,	but	 involve	no	 IPR	 infringements,	 to	reflect	a	more	realistic	nature	of	
product	piracy.		
	
For	 the	 second	 theme,	 the	 article	 detailed	 some	 underlying	 and	 routine	 activities	 in	 the	





appears	 to	 be	 made	 up	 of	 individuals	 and	 small	 and	 medium	 enterprises,	 similar	 to	 the	







Thus,	 this	 article	 examined	wine	 counterfeiting	within	 the	 analytical	 framework	of	 organised	
crime	 research,	with	 a	 view	 to	 contributing	 to	 the	 careful	 and	 comprehensive	 analysis	 of	 the	
nature	 of	 the	 problem	 (Levi	 and	 Maguire	 2004).	 A	 further	 reason	 to	 situate	 commodity	
counterfeiting	 in	the	context	of	organised	crime	 is	 to	persuade	policy	makers	 to	prioritise	 the	



















practices.	 Some	 are	 shared—for	 example,	 those	 associated	 with	 multi‐agency	 areas	 of	
responsibility—whilst	 others	 appear	 more	 problematic	 for	 China,	 including	 weak	 law	







economy,	 entrepreneurial	 activities—including	 illegitimate	 business	 practices—are	 market‐
driven.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 as	 long	 as	 neoliberalism	 continues	 in	 China,	 it	 is	 hard	 for	 the	 state	 to	
effectively	 intervene	and	stop	 illegal	money‐making	methods,	 even	where	harsh	penalties	are	
available	(Shen	2016b).		
	
Compared	 with	 other	 social,	 legal	 and	 economic	 problems,	 product	 counterfeiting	 is	 still	 an	
under‐researched	area.	This	article	provides	insights	into	the	wine	counterfeiting	business	which	
were	 gained	 from	 the	 rich	 data	 drawn	 from	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 published	materials:	 research	
monographs,	 academic	 and	 specialist	 journals	 (for	 example,	 the	 China	 Anti‐Counterfeiting	
Report),	 official	 reports	 and	 other	 supporting	materials	 in	 open	 sources	 in	 both	 English	 and	
Chinese	 languages.	 It	 used	wine	 counterfeiting	 in	 China	 as	 a	 case	 study	 to	 piece	 together	 the	
disparate	parts	of	the	criminal	market	and,	therefore,	sheds	some	new	light	on	the	complex	and	
































counterfeiters	 adopted	 several	marketing	 strategies,	 including	making	 every	effort	 to	 create	 a	 luxury	
image	for	their	fake	products.	For	example,	they	offered	to	sell	cheap	gift	sets	of	Shanye	wines	to	attract	




3	 The	major	 limitations	 of	 the	method	 include:	 the	 data	were	 drawn	 from	what	was	 available	 in	 open	
sources	at	the	time	of	the	research,	hence	there	is	a	‘generalisation	issue’;	the	information	that	the	article	
relied	 upon	was	 largely	 gathered	 from	cases	 that	were	 detected	by	 the	 authorities	 and	 subsequently	
publicised,	and	thus	‘successful’	counterfeiting	schemes	and	unreported	cases	were	not	included	in	the	
analysis;	and	it	is	possible	that	the	official	and	media	accounts	were	biased	towards	only	law	enforcement	
measures	and	performance	which	have	been	successful,	and	thus	failures	are	omitted.	
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